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Prior to receiving a memorandum from the Director of Risk 
Management that the libraries would be included in a 
university-wide risk assessment study, the authors’ only 
contacts with the director had to do with art works housed 
in the library and the amount of money kept on-hand at the 
service desks.  We believed that the Risk Assessment 
Office was primarily concerned with highly vulnerable 
programs such as the hospitals, pharmacies, athletics, the 
bookstore, and laboratories. The challenge for us now 
would be to develop a comprehensive assessment of risks 
in library facilities and operations from acquisitions and 
cataloging to circulation, interlibrary loan, reference, and 
archives. 
 
Although the authors and library supervisors did not have 
university risk assessment guidelines or policies to base 
decision-making on, we, perhaps intuitively, considered 
risks when developing library policies or procedures which 
involved collecting money at a service desk, ordering and 
receiving of educational materials and supplies, handling 
rare books, and picking-up large gift collections from 
donors.  But until receiving the notice that the libraries 
were included in the university-wide assessment study, the 
authors had no plans to lead such a study. We quite frankly 
questioned the need for the libraries to be included in the 
consultant’s study because we collect very little money, 
have very few chemicals or other hazards in the libraries, 
and do not put employees or patrons at-risk like hospitals 
do. 
 
Our question was answered by the consultant at our first 
meeting. The primary reasons why the libraries were 
included in the study were due to the monetary value of 
materials ordered throughout the fiscal year, the value of all 
materials in the Doy Leale McCall Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library (McCall Library), as well as total 
revenue from fines, lost books, interlibrary loans, and copy 
cards. News headlines about thefts from library rare book 
rooms contrasted with the common perception that libraries 
were quiet, safe places where users can locate research 
articles, find information, or study without putting 
themselves in danger.  Librarians themselves may have 
entered the field with similar expectations.  
 
Rather, library administrators are likely to believe that the 
most significant risks they face are natural disasters such as 
hurricanes, tornadoes, fires, floods, or earthquakes. In 
coastal areas, for instance, collections may be at risk from 
high humidity, pests, or other conditions that pose a risk to 
collections. The threat of active shooters or terrorists who 
could enter the library with weapons is likely to be 
regarded as even more dangerous and more likely to occur 
in today’s environment than natural disasters.  
 
The most common and age-old threat that librarians take 
into consideration may be theft of materials by patrons. 
Library staff may not have the inclination, nor the time, to 
monitor patron behavior. It is easier to believe that students 
come to academic libraries to study, do research, or read—
not to steal books, razor cut articles from bound journals, 
and so forth. (Those are crimes of opportunity, as well as 
less prevalent in the digital age.) Nevertheless, security 
systems for decades have been regarded as necessities, 
rather than frills by academic and other library 
administrators to prevent theft. High risk areas such as 
manuscript collections, rare book rooms, and supply rooms 
are often monitored by video surveillance systems installed 
to deter theft, or to track it when it occurs.  
 
Counter measures, on the one hand, may be only as good as 
the people enforcing, monitoring, or implementing them. 
On the other hand, few if any counter measures may stop 
something from happening. Hurricanes, flooding, HVAC 
leaks, roof leaks, active shooters, and theft occur. Take 
theft as an example, installing video surveillance systems 
are not likely to stop determined and knowledgeable 
thieves from stealing students’ laptops. Surveillance 
systems may, however, be deterrents to would-be thieves. 
Installing anti-theft measures on works of framed art are no 
more likely to prevent someone wanting the piece from 
ripping-off the frame to steal it. Deterrents, by definition, 
help to prevent or limit damage, theft, and crimes from 
happening.  The authors certainly want to touch on many of 
the topics such as these, but we primarily want to focus on 
how we went about assessing risk and developing counter-
measures that we found appropriate. 
 
Case Background - The Consultant  
 
In late 2014, the Director of Risk Management notified 
twenty-three key university administrators that the Marsh 
Risk Consulting (MRCO) was hired to conduct a campus-
wide strategic risk assessment and analysis. The 
administrators were scheduled to meet with the consultant 
during the last week of January 2015. The administrative 
staff included those in the offices of the president, the vice-
presidents, the internal auditor, computer services, financial 
aid, facilities management, housing, human resources, 
athletics, engineering and design, purchasing, public 
relations. The Dean of University Libraries and Director of 
the McCall Library (who reports to the dean) also were 
scheduled to meet with the consultant. 
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The consultant’s sessions were designed to generate an 
open dialogue about risks to the University. He defined a 
“risk” as follows: (a) the probability of threat of damage, 
(b) injury, liability, (c) loss, or (d) any other negative 
consequence that was caused by external or internal 
vulnerabilities, and that may or may not be avoided through 
preemptive action. 
 
Risks were further categorized as: (a) strategic, (b) 
financial, (c) operational or (d) hazard.   The latter 
represents a potential source of harm to the health of a 
person or persons, or to a university asset. An operational 
risk was associated with an internal, external, system, or 
employee failure. An employee, for example, who does not 
comply with a university policy or an environmental or 
safety law may put himself, or others, at risk. There might 
be a financial risk to non-compliance as well.  Besides 
thinking of these risk categories, the key administrators 
were asked to be prepared to discuss two questions with the 
consultant: What critical risks did you foresee for the 
activities of your department or field of University 
operations? In general, what critical risks did you foresee 
for overall University operations and activities? Another 
parameter of the consultant’s role was to determine what 
countermeasures the department, school or college took, if 
any, to mitigate the risks that were cited. 
 
University Background     
 
A relatively young institution, the USA was founded in 
1963 in Mobile, Alabama, becoming the first state 
supported public institution for higher education in south 
Alabama.  The university has grown from one building in 
1963 to a sprawling campus in west Mobile, as well as two 
hospitals and a cancer institute located in mid-town Mobile.  
Enrollment today tops 16,000 students (head count). With 
clinics, the physicians and hospitals comprising the USA 
Health System cared for more than 250,000 people in 2015. 
 
Nine colleges and schools provide quality education in 
business, computing, arts and sciences, education, 
engineering, nursing, the allied health professions, and 
medicine. USA offers 12 doctoral degrees, a Medical 
Doctor (MD) degree, 32 master’s degrees, an Education 
Specialist degree, and various programs leading to 53 
baccalaureate degrees.  With over 5,500 employees, USA 
has a payroll of $400 million. External contracts and grants 
are over $50 million annually. As a charter member of the 
Sun Belt Conference in 1976, the university fields 17 
Division 1 sports teams, including football, baseball, 
basketball, tennis, soccer, softball, and volleyball.  
 
The rapid growth of USA over such a very short time is 
certainly the backdrop for the need to look at risks. 
Realization of the need led to the establishment in the 
1990’s of the Office of Risk Management and Insurance. 
Outside of this office, however, risk assessment has not 
been a formal process, or responsibility, assigned to anyone 
in most administrative or academic offices with the 
exception of medical facilities. Risk insurance and claims, 
for example, are handled by central administration for cost 
saving purposes.  
Other academic administrators at USA have to consider 
risks and risk avoidance as a normal or natural aspect of 
decision making. However, in higher education, many 
university administrators probably rose to their positions 
based on their academic merit and without the benefit of 
management education or training, much less risk 
management training.  So, with such diversity of programs 
and facilities, it made sense for central administration to 
look to deans, directors, and department heads to assess and 
manage risks and threats, at least in selected vulnerable 
programs.  
 
Library Background 
 
From a couple of rooms in the USA’s first building (1964), 
library services and resources have grown exponentially. A 
large four story facility was built in 1968. When its 
capacity looked like it would be reached by the early 1990s 
plans were made to expand by renovating a residence hall 
near the newly constructed College of Medicine facility for 
a bio-medical library.  By 2000, the Biomedical Library 
collections were growing quickly, as were the information 
needs of the doctors, nurses and other medical personnel, 
so information resources were made available at the 
Medical Center and Children’s & Women’s Hospital for 
use by medical staff.   
 
With donations of many thousands of photographs and 
negatives and manuscripts, as well as university archives, a 
separate archives was finally formed in the late 1980s. It is 
now called the Doy Leale McCall Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library in recognition of a highly valued 
collection of early Alabama historical manuscripts, slave 
records, and books appraised at over $3.1 million.   
 
Finally, a small collection of business related books and 
current journals were moved from the Marx Library to the 
Mitchell College of Business when it was renovated in 
2008 for a Learning Resource Center.  
 
Literature Review 
 
The authors searched for similar case studies in the 
literature. Our literature review revealed a rich bibliography 
of articles and books about topics such as library security, 
natural risks, library crime, disaster preparedness, risk 
assessment, risk insurance, prevention, and the 
countermeasures that were used to reduce library risks, 
particularly with respect to protecting collections.  We 
found two very good manuals and starting points for 
librarians, library managers, and library boards included a 
manual by Breighner, Payton, Drewes, and Myers (2005) 
and a guide by Kahn (2008). In each, the authors defined 
risk identification and management, the process, cost 
avoidance, loss prevention and control, risk, property 
valuation, handling claims, and the like    
 
Kahn’s (2008) manual included a section on external risks 
such as plantings, ramps, lighting and walkways and 
possible counter-measures. His discussion of internal areas 
such as stairwells, windows, mechanical rooms, and 
lighting was noteworthy. If the reader were to buy only one 
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book on overall risk management, Kahn’s (2008) library 
and security guide would be a good choice. 
 
A study by Raffensperger (2010) examined the level of risk 
based on property and violent crimes using Clery Act data 
and Uniform Crime Report data. He compared campus 
crime rates in academic environments with general crime 
rates. From this data-driven approach, he developed a 
model for risk assessment, prioritization of efforts, and 
prevention.  However, this article did not help to develop 
the risk assessment analysis needed for a case study 
approach. 
 
A book by Shuman (1999) differs in orientation, looking 
largely at crimes of theft, prevention, policies, and 
procedures from a broad legal, security, and behavioral 
perspective and with an eye toward developing a 
comprehensive security plan. Shuman also discussed 
electronic security issues and solutions, as well as the 
future of library security. The author provided a very 
comprehensive bibliography for those who want to be 
experts in such matters.  
 
A SPEC kit by Soete and Zimmerman (1999) for the 
Association of Research Libraries (ARL) surveyed 45 of 
122 members and provided a number of documents or 
forms used to illustrate incident reports, emergency closing 
policies, bomb recognition points, recovery responsibilities, 
attempted theft procedures, and many similar procedures or 
policies regarding use or misuse of computer, theft of 
library materials, use of fire extinguishers, and so forth.  
The SPEC kit, however, did not present results, or a 
methodology, the authors could utilize in preparing for a 
risk assessment, particularly because USA is not an ARL 
library.  
 
The American Institute for Conservation of Historic and 
Artistic Work (AIC) offers any person access to its Risk 
Evaluation Planning Program (REPP) site questionnaire; 
just completing it can reveal lacunae in staff and 
emergency preparedness, policies, procedures, fire safety, 
and environment.  
 
The National Center for Preservation Technology offers a 
free online program and easy-to-use template useful for 
institutions that want to develop a comprehensive disaster 
plan (dPlan). Its preservation leaflets provides free advice 
on a variety of preservation topics, as well as links to 
additional resources. 
 
Methodology 
 
The authors prepared a preliminary outline listing risks by 
departments or areas as follows: (a) General, (b) 
Acquisitions, receiving, cataloging, processing; (c) 
Archives, rare book & special collections; (d) Art and art 
galleries; (e) Circulation (access services); (f) Interlibrary 
loan; (g) Loading and receiving areas; (h) Printing and 
copying; (i) Stacks, office, and other areas;  (j) Systems; 
and (k) Travel. This list served as a checklist to help assure 
that major areas were not overlooked in the process. 
 
Under each heading, we identified the most obvious risks 
such as theft, mutilation, ordering library materials for 
personal use, using library supplies and hardware for 
personal use, improper use of photocopying machines, and 
the like. The authors presented this list at the initial meeting 
(January 2015) of department head and asked department 
heads to help flesh-out a libraries risk assessment strategy, 
provide additional input, as well as assist in developing 
countermeasures in their respective departments.  
 
Library Department Assessment Results 
 
Not having been faced with disasters like Katrina since 
2005, library administration and department heads first 
surveyed risks from theft, unsecured doors, electrical 
hazards, and other easy to identify risks—the “low hanging 
fruit”. Seeing too many devices plugged into an outlet or 
electrical strip, for instance, is easy to spot. USA 
employees a safety officer and staff who periodically 
inspect university offices for potential hazards. The safety 
office staff are always willing to offer advice on counter 
measures to prevent circuit overloads, fire, or other failures. 
These staff will also review door and window hardware and 
provide suggestions as to how to improve room security, 
access and egress. Such assistance may be far more 
valuable than the advice offered by a manual or website 
because the advice is specific to the problem or need. As a 
result, work orders can be initiated to correct safety 
concerns, or improve security.  
 
There are more ordinary risks or threats associated with 
matters not normally thought of as threatening. Such 
decisions as scheduling library hours of operation, the 
implementing of new programs and policies, and picking-
up gift books from donors are examples. To illustrate one 
of these examples, we considered a very common issue in 
academic libraries: extending library hours. At USA, for 
instance, this matter arises nearly every year during student 
government association elections, when at least one 
candidate runs on a platform of extending library hours.  
By staying open 24 x 7 or 24 x 5 the library staff and users 
at USA would be more likely to be exposed to increased 
security risks such as assaults or muggings. If adding a 
third shift (without hiring additional staff) decreased 
staffing available for daytime programs, there would be 
new challenges, particularly when existing staff are ill or on 
vacation. Hiring student assistants to do the work of 
classified staff at the circulation desk, for example, is likely 
in increase mistakes made in taking payments for fines and 
lost books at the circulation desk. Regardless, library 
administration on principle should limit risk by imposing 
stricter cash register and accounting rules to limit 
opportunities for theft.   
 
A related risk was failing to provide timely and proper 
training of employees regardless of category (student, part- 
or full-time staff, professional or paraprofessional). 
Carefully training and supervising staff responsible for 
accounts receivable, ordering library materials, or receiving 
materials should always be regarded as good safeguards 
against theft. We made sure that staff who order materials 
are different from those who do the receiving.  
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We examined whether we allow library staff to use their 
own vehicles to box and pick-up gift collections at donors’ 
homes or offices. This practice at the very least raises 
insurance liability questions and could, of course, result in 
injury, absenteeism and workmen’s compensation issues. 
This is particularly sensitive because many library 
employees are older and, hence, more vulnerable to back 
injury. So, library administration now carefully approaches 
donors when they express interest in donating large 
collections and try to have the donors be responsible for 
delivering the gift collection to the library.  When this is 
not possible, we ask student assistants to help or work with 
university personnel to pick-up the material.  
 
It is the responsibility of library administrators and 
department heads when making decisions to always 
consider a diverse array of environmental, behavioral, 
finance, personnel, and legal factors that pose risks. Such 
factors are not always obvious at first blush. While it may 
seem perfectly reasonable, for instance, to approve having 
food and wine for a reception at the library, university 
policies should be checked before giving approval. This is 
because university libraries do not have liquor licenses, but 
they do have underage students studying who might attend 
the reception. Another reason may be that university 
contracts with food vendors who have equirements or 
policies restricting what is, or is not, permissible.   
 
While unaware of any academic libraries that currently 
employ metal detectors or armed guards to prevent 
terrorism or acts of violence, library administrators years 
ago replaced staff or student guards with security gates that 
alarm when an item leaves that has not been desensitized. 
Will library administrators go full circle and once again 
hire armed security guards in an attempt to protect their 
facilities from violence or active shooters scenarios? In any 
case, it is expected that library directors today do realize 
that active shooters are just as likely to visit the library as 
they would any other facility on their campus. 
 
This case study is concerned with the counter-measures that 
the Marx Library took to avoid or limit risk. Library 
administrators have developed many counter-measures to 
prevent, or limit, associated risks (See Appendix 1). 
Among these are security systems, video surveillance 
systems, lockable supply cabinets, and cash register, all 
intended to protect library property by limiting theft. In 
some cases, these same counter-measures may also help 
prevent or minimize new forms of risk such as active 
shooter scenarios.  
 
Mobile, Alabama, is at risk of hurricanes for much of the 
year and has an “Emergency Response and Recovery Plan” 
(April 2015) in place as a guideline for handling a variety 
of campus-wide emergencies, including hurricanes. This 
publication also discusses bomb threats, the university’s 
notification system, hostage situations, hazmat incidents, 
and other weather conditions. Library employees are asked 
periodically to study this manual. The Safety Office has 
planned or surprise drills to help employees prepare for 
such events. In 2015, for instance, a planned bomb threat in 
Marx Library was coordinated between university, city, 
county and other offices. 
 
The President of USA is responsible for the overall 
direction of the campus’ emergency preparation and 
response and recovery plan.  In the case of a hurricane, 
therefore, the USA libraries themselves take direction from 
the President’s Council of key personnel. This group makes 
decisions about cancelling classes, closing campus, 
directing staff and students to designated safe buildings, 
and so forth as the situation dictates. After the hurricane, 
damage is reported by all building facility managers, 
overall damage is assessed university wide, and appropriate 
corrective actions (counter measures) are developed and 
approved to handle reports of damage, re-entry to campus 
and buildings, resumption of classes, insurance claims, and 
so forth.  
      
Systems 
 
Data preservation of bibliographic databases is not 
addressed in the most recent risk assessment by the 
consultant. Our online catalog is hosted and not managed 
on site. The vendor of the hosting service provides 
technical support, including full backups and other data 
security measures as well as physical security of the server 
itself. 
 
The list of countermeasures addressed in the Marx Library 
Risk Assessment does not address in detail violent 
situations like that of an assault/attack, active shooter or 
bomb threat, and so on. Those types of events require 
different responses and will certainly involve local/campus 
police, fire department and emergency medical support. 
The reporting requirements for these events are also 
different.   
The first example shows the current risks for the Marx 
Library Systems department. They include:  
 
• Theft or damage to computers (including thin 
clients) and related equipment such as printers, 
scanners, card readers, etc. 
• Misuse of computers (including thin clients) such 
as downloading pornography or sending 
malware/viruses. 
• Hacking of library catalog leading to possible 
corruption or theft of patron and financial data 
including fines, purchases, invoice, etc. 
• Theft of software. 
 
There are a diverse number of countermeasures that the 
USA libraries take to limit risk. Use of password 
protection, authentication, and user verification help protect 
library computers/users. While a single-sign-on provides a 
stronger level of protection, the university has not yet 
implemented this capability.  
 
Video surveillance of high risk areas where there are many 
computers has proven to be a very useful tool in preventing 
theft or catching thieves. Video surveillance is useful 
because few libraries provide trained security staff to 
actively monitor exits, stacks, and areas that need to be 
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surveilled. No exception, the Marx Library has very good 
video surveillance of these areas, but no one is actively 
reviewing the video feed. Nonetheless, video surveillance 
systems are expensive and must be updated. Marx 
Library’s first video surveillance system, installed in 2004, 
was an analog system which required images to be stored 
on a codec in the library. It was replaced in 2014 by a 
digital system; now the video can be viewed over the 
internet from a number of locations, including the 
university police station. This counter-measure is reactive. 
In other words, checking a video feed occurs after 
something happens, to identify the perpetrators, crime, time 
and date. While not perfect, this deterrent is effective. 
Because of limited library staff during evening and 
weekend hours, the system is the first line of defense. 
Signage is used to alert users to the presence of the video 
surveillance system. The system, in fact, is more of a 
deterrent than the presence of library staff because users 
know it records who comes and goes. 
 
Another reason why theft of computers or damage to them 
is limited is because computers and computer labs are 
ubiquitous on the USA campus, including residence halls. 
In addition, USA students are required to have access to a 
privately owned computer. The Marx Library’s computer 
lab and public workstations, located throughout the 
building, offer convenience to students who are more likely 
to have a laptop or workstation in their room or home. 
 
Replacing higher value computers with thin clients, which 
are less costly long term, and lack operational capability 
when disconnected from the network, were also deployed. 
When installed these devices connect to a central VM 
server housed in the Computer Support Center computer 
room. This server delivers access to software and research 
tools through the thin client. Without access to a similar 
server, these devices are useless. 
 
Where thin clients are not appropriate, computers are used. 
Each has anti-virus and anti-malware software installed. 
While neither software tool is 100% effective, they provide 
some protection. Additionally, Deep freeze software is 
installed on all computers. Whenever a computer is 
rebooted, anything changed or loaded by an ordinary user is 
deleted and the machine reverts to its original 
configuration. Anti-theft devices are installed on devices in 
public areas; they secure computers and thin clients to each 
other and furniture or other generally immovable objects.  
 
Marx Library’s electronic classroom and computer lab are 
locked unless library student employees or staff/faculty are 
available to supervise access and use. One equipped study 
room (ML 123) has a projector and computer. This room is 
kept locked when not in use, and the key must be checkout 
(like a book) by eligible users (USA students, faculty and 
staff). Users are required to return the key afterwards in 
order to leave and retrieve their ID card. 
 
Although limited, the university does provide some data 
preservation and protection. Each individual who is 
employed by the Marx Library has access to a network 
drive for data storage. It is an individual’s responsibility to 
backup files and other data.  
 
Circulation Department and Stacks 
 
The staff in the circulation departments of Marx Library 
and the Biomedical Library are largely responsible for 
building security and safety because they staff the libraries 
during all hours of operation. It is important, therefore, that 
they become very familiar with the USA Emergency 
Responses and Recovery Plan (2015). All staff are 
encouraged by library administration to stay familiar with 
the policies and procedures in the manual because it covers 
all types of emergencies, including violent crimes, bomb 
threats, gas leaks, explosions, reporting emergencies, and 
the campus notification system. 
 
The circulation desks at these libraries is where payments 
are taken for fines, lost books, copy cards, copying, 
interlibrary loan payments, and the like. Reducing the 
number of collection points throughout the libraries has 
always been a major factor in limiting risk and a practice 
encouraged by the university’s internal auditors. 
Nonetheless, the university’s internal auditor and risk 
management officer have always regarded the libraries as 
at-risk--although at low risk compared to the bookstore, or 
where student tuition and fees are centrally collected on 
campus.   
 
Most security measures at circulation desks will not stop 
determined thieves because they know that there is money 
in the cash register or drawer. Access is limited to full-time 
staff in order to limit risk. In Marx Library, there is a very 
secure bank vault that is used to store the cash drawer 
overnight, but the other libraries do not have this option. 
The faculty reserves materials are kept nearby as well and 
include special items, including items owned privately by 
teaching faculty. Some may be rare and even valuable. 
Another risk is that fines may be expunged from the ILS or 
finance systems like banner by trained circulation staff 
without permission. 
 
Collecting money requires careful handling and training of 
staff. Even if there is no malicious intent, staff may make 
mistakes when counting money, making deposits, and the 
like. Two library staff members are responsible for 
counting the money, making deposits and locking the cash 
in the safe at the end of the day. In this situation, such 
requirements and habits are strong deterrents vis-à-vis only 
having one person being responsible. We limit handling 
fines or money to library staff (not student assistants). 
 
Constant supervision of the Circulation area is maintained 
and a minimum of one staff member is on duty at all times. 
The libraries print/copy cards are not free. Blank cards 
must be kept secure and access limited. Cards may be 
purchased ($.50) and value added by users at the 
Circulation Desk. In any case, countermeasures “keep 
honest persons honest.”  
 
Video surveillance systems can reduce crimes of 
opportunity, but rarely eliminate them. Strategic location of 
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the cameras help to determine the success of preventing 
theft. Using a cash register, and enforcing tight procedures, 
for collection of fines and lost book payments, help limit, 
but does not totally curtail, the potential for employee theft.  
 
Theft in the public areas of the library like the stacks or 
large study spaces are most often crimes of opportunity 
involving unattended backpacks, purses, laptops, or cell 
phones. A thief can easily spot and take such things, 
particularly when there are few patrons around who might 
observe the theft.  We addressed this matter in 2003 by 
installing a video surveillance system. At that time, a 
university police officer helped to design and install the 
library’s analog surveillance system. We were careful to 
have every entrance, exit, and elevator under view. The 
library has a large art gallery, so several cameras were 
installed in the gallery to protect the art, as well as to assure 
artists that their works were relatively safe although we do 
not employ a guard. Cameras with wide angle lenses were 
installed in some stack areas.  
 
Since the analog cameras were installed originally, the 
library upgraded to a digital system that stores the images 
on centralized servers and permit real-time access to 
university police. Signs are posted throughout the library 
that video surveillance is being used. Perpetrators caught 
stealing laptops initially, for example, have mostly been 
individuals from the Mobile community who intentionally 
came to steal laptops and re-sell them. Consequently, 
laptop theft has diminished, so the authors believe that the 
deterrence value of surveillance systems cannot be 
emphasized enough.  
 
Most crimes committed in the Marx Library stacks are 
indeed crimes of opportunity. These include theft of 
backpacks, purses, clothing, unattended laptops, cell 
phones, flash drives and of course library materials (books, 
media, and other materials). Perpetrators run the gamut, 
including students, staff, faculty, and community members. 
 
Although none of the libraries are in danger of flood 
waters, there are periodic leaks due to the flat roofs and 
from heating and air (HVAC) systems. When there are rain 
storms in Mobile, the circulation staff in Marx Library 
frequently need to cover book stacks on the top floor, as 
well as other locations on the first floor. Plastic tarps are 
kept available for that purpose. Beyond this, however, the 
university’s facilities staff are called to repair HVAC and 
roof leak problems. That is, library employees are not 
encouraged or required to make repairs. 
      
Technical Services Department 
 
Technical services at the Marx library is comprised of two 
sections, Cataloging and Collection Management / 
Acquisitions. They have different risks: (a) Employees 
ordering books or materials for themselves through the 
library, (b) Employees stealing new books or materials 
before they are cataloged and on the shelves, (c) 
Unauthorized people accessing staff-only areas and stealing 
materials or personal items and (d) Injury occurring when 
moving heavy boxes of materials. 
 
Keeping doors closed, and locking up vulnerable areas and 
materials, minimizes casual theft as does separating the 
individual processes and procedures across the sections 
(cataloging, acquisitions, receiving and mailroom). In other 
words, taking such countermeasures is a form of checks 
and balances. No one person is responsible for the entire 
process. We further limit access by only opening boxes of 
materials that can be handled in one sitting. If something 
interferes, and staff are unable to completely process a box, 
they are required to tape it back up until processing can be 
finished. Basically this reduces the opportunity for casual 
theft.  
 
Following strict procedures to maintain a paper trail 
through acquisitions to cataloging, and promptly stamping 
materials with the library ownership stamp when received 
also reduces the opportunity for theft. High value items are 
kept in a large walk in vault in the Marx Library or in the 
McCall Archives. Procedures to document access to the 
vault are also strictly enforced.  
 
Other risks involve activities that may result in injuries. 
Encouraging staff to use carts or load bearing tools when 
moving materials also reduces potential injuries. Training 
on how to properly lift, as well as the safe use of box 
cutters and other sharp tools to minimize the chance of a 
cutting injury are important countermeasures. 
 
University Archives 
 
Unlike other library departments, the Doy Leale McCall 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library (McCall Library) has 
collections that contain valuable artifacts and materials. 
When McCall Library was moved into a renovated space in 
the Marx Library in 2016, the architects, library 
administration, security office, computer center staff, risk 
assessment officer, and others reviewed the plans with risk 
assessment and prevention clearly in mind. Nonetheless, 
theft or loss of rare and high value items is a constant 
possibility for a variety of reasons including that materials 
in this area, are not stamped, barcoded, or tattle taped. 
While catalog records may establish provenance of an item, 
or help in identification of items, they are not much help 
deterring theft. Lack of adequate preservation may also 
contribute to the loss of these materials.    
 
McCall Library countermeasures are more extensive than 
for the rest of the library. This department has increased 
physical security (barriers, locks and limited access) as well 
as state-of-the-art video surveillance. Again, as there is no 
staff dedicated to active monitoring of the surveillance 
system, it is a passive system, good only after a loss or 
damage has occurred.  Other measure include: (a) an 
independent climate control system to help preserve fragile 
materials, and (b) enforced use of other positive measures 
such as cloth gloves and archival boxes, or other storage 
materials to help reduce deterioration of archival 
collections/materials. Patrons may only access these 
materials in a controlled area, a reading room. Additionally, 
users are banned from using pens and other potentially 
damaging devices. Access to the archives and collections is 
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strictly controlled and monitored. Patrons using the reading 
room are not allowed to bring in bags, briefcases etc. They 
may bring in paper and pencils. 
      
Other library areas 
 
Marx Library contains two public art galleries that feature 
exhibits by local and regional artists. The main gallery is 
located on the third floor and also has twelve glass display 
cases that often features photographs, crafts, jewelry, and 
other artifacts. Both galleries, including the display cases, 
are under video surveillance. The cameras are very visible 
intentionally. No security guard is provided at any time. In 
another area of the library, an original Rembrandt etching is 
on permanent display and the Risk Office required that a 
specialty lock be installed; it is also under video 
surveillance at all times. Although the video surveillance 
system is the only counter measure, there have been no 
thefts of art to date.  
 
Failure to return interlibrary loan materials has costs and 
can impact the reputation of the Library. Because material 
to be picked-up is behind a secured door during evening 
and weekend hours, there have been no instances of theft. 
The staff in this department have a very good tracking 
system as well. 
 
The Marx Library’s auditorium contains audio-visual 
equipment which would be very expensive to replace if 
stolen or damaged. Anytime this equipment is requested, 
the requestor is asked to arrive early to have his/her 
presentation loaded to the workstation ahead of time and 
learn how to operate the equipment if necessary. Risk is 
further minimized because the dean’s staff carefully 
monitor requests for reservations. If a group previously 
caused damage to equipment of the facility, for instance, 
the policy is to deny future requests. 
 
Marx Library’s electronic instruction room contains thin 
clients and workstations, two flat screen televisions, a 
projector and an instructor’s computer/workstation. To 
replace or repair this equipment would be expensive. Risk 
is minimized by limiting access to library instructors. That 
is, regular university classes are never scheduled in this 
classroom. 
 
Public institutions are often self-insured; this is an added 
vulnerability.  Self-insurance does not mean that there is a 
lack of insurance. Rather, being self-insured is a conscious 
decision to accept risks, quantify them, and create a reserve 
to cover the identified risks when there are claims.  
 
Most libraries will assume the risk of lost books, 
computers, supplies, and so on. It would not be cost-
effective to pay insurance premiums to cover the cost of 
most lost books, even though some rare books and 
manuscripts might be of value to collectors and others. This 
is the case with many items in the Doy Leale McCall Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library. One collection alone was 
appraised in the millions. The university’s risk and 
insurance program would account for such loss. 
 
For example, there are more than 13,000 cellulose nitrate 
portraits in the Erik Overbey Collection which was 
acquired in 1978 and housed in the McCall Library in a 
separate, temperature controlled room. Special containers 
were fabricated locally to safely move the collection to 
Marx Library, as well as safely store the nitrate collections. 
The collection is also being digitized to limit access to this 
fragile collection. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this case study was to identify vulnerable 
areas and countermeasures to reduce risks. The authors 
include examples from nearly every department in Marx 
Library, the main library at USA. However, no one plan 
can address every possible scenario that may arise. A 
central purpose of discussing risks and countermeasures 
with department heads is to bring awareness of 
vulnerabilities, then develop ways to eliminate or reduce 
risks. Countermeasures must fit the actual situation that 
occurs, as well as the budget available to implement them. 
In any case, identifying risks is the starting point. Risk 
assessment studies should be done periodically throughout 
library departments because new risks not only arise, but 
also new countermeasures are likely to be needed, or old 
ones adapted. Video surveillance technology, for example, 
advances significantly every five or so years and cameras 
will need to be replaced. Analog networks are no longer 
being supported at USA for instance.  
 
Plan what to do in case of emergency. Decide ahead of time 
who is responsible for specific tasks in an emergency. 
Strictly enforce policy and procedures. Train staff how to 
respond to different types of emergencies.  For example, 
each public service desk is stocked with cans of wasp spray 
to thwart an active shooter. Wasp spray has a great range 
and is incapacitating without requiring special skills, but is 
not lethal.  
 
Identify vulnerable areas and effective countermeasures. 
These include area/sections that have only one way in/out, 
as well as those offices and areas that have glass fronts, or 
those areas that are not supervised (mailroom).  Some areas 
of any library are simply more vulnerable than others. 
Constant coming and going of authorized staff/workers 
complicates securing these areas. In the case of the Marx 
Library, the receiving area requires a key to turn off the 
internal door alarm and a key to open the external doors 
into the area. Constant reminders only go so far. Vendors 
are asked to use the main entrances to the library rather 
than the receiving area. Such security measures do not 
solve the problem for university staff working for facilities 
engineering, or even the Computer Support Center. Have 
student assistants wear something that easily identifies 
them such as badges. 
 
General areas, need to be considered for risk as well. 
Reducing risk is possible by training staff to recognize risks 
and take action when encountered. Similarly, 
implementation of video surveillance also helps.  
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The authors found that fixing or replacing faulty door 
hardware and locks is an easy, but often overlooked, 
security measure. For example, there was a large gap 
between the wood doors leading into the cataloging 
department. All a thief had to do to gain access was to use a 
thin object to release the bolt. Installing a metal strip to 
block the gap now prevents access. So, it is very important 
to encourage the replacement of faulty door hardware.  
 
Improving communications within or from the library is 
also important. This might be as simple as the installation 
of telephones that ring directly to the circulation desk. Such 
phones could be located throughout the stacks and on all 
floors. Library administration is determining the feasibility 
of doing so because it is expected to help reduce risk and 
also expedite reporting of problems. A related step would 
be to post emergency telephone numbers at these sites. So, 
while nearly all students have cell phones to report 
problems in public areas of the libraries, having telephones 
and emergency numbers should allow quicker notification 
and, hence, quicker reaction by police, staff, or other first 
responders. 
 
Part of the problem of managing risk is getting the 
information to the right people in a timely manner. The 
appropriate action is more than a mere phone call. 
Encourage people to report incidents, share information, 
log elevator problems, etc. Staff are the first line of 
defense. Make sure staff know the applicable policies. It 
may be as simple as locking doors for areas and rooms that 
are not in use all the time. This may require an investment 
in new locks. Likewise, consider extending the PA system 
to all staff areas. People cannot respond to emergencies if 
they don’t know there is one. 
 
Although routines and training might cause complacency, 
they may also ingrain specific actions in given situations. 
Routines also help reduce or manage risk. If staff are 
frightened or stressed, following a routine may allow staff 
to respond more quickly. In other scenarios, routines may 
allow detection of problems that might otherwise go 
unnoticed. Also, checking with the Safety Office on proper 
procedures for inspecting fire extinguishers, and 
incorporating any recommendations into library 
procedures, should insure that they are in working order. 
Similarly, keeping emergency procedures up-to-date and 
having an active emergency committee regularly review 
those procedures, will help to ensure safety. Keeping an 
inventory of fire extinguishers current, for instance, will 
help to insure there is an adequate number of functioning 
fire extinguishers and that they are located in strategic 
locations. Having functioning fire extinguishers in the right 
place, however, will do little to reduce risk if staff do not 
know how to use them. Our risk assessment review led to 
asking the university’s fire Marshall to hold a training 
session on how to use extinguishers. It was surprising how 
many employees did not know how. Training, in general, is 
often the most important countermeasure and way to reduce 
risks. It is critical that library staff know what to do in an 
emergency. Besides reviewing procedures and emergency 
plans, if possible, practice.  
 
Another key element is being able to recognize and 
distinguish between library users and employees. One way 
is to provide lanyards or other standard device that identify 
student/staff workers. Signage will help direct library 
patrons in the book stacks looking for materials to a safe 
place. People might not otherwise know where to go, or 
what to do, in case of an emergency. Examples include, 
placing evacuation maps throughout the library, or even 
post QR codes in stacks that will autodial cell phones to the 
Circulation Dept. 
 
In this day and age, it would be foolish to ignore potentially 
violent situations. This category includes bomb threats, 
active shooter situations, fights, vandalism, aggressive 
patrons, etc. To address a potential violent situation, library 
leaders need to be aware of, and plan out, what the best 
response would be (as far as anyone can tell beforehand). 
At a minimum, there are two Youtube films that can be 
shown to employees: Auburn University’s Active Shooter 
Response Training (ALICE) and UAPD Active Shooter 
Video: Avoid, Deny, and Defend. The USA campus police 
also led a session for library employees and showed a film. 
Finally, a bomb threat was simulated and coordinated with 
the police department, the Safety Office, city, county and 
other offices. Such training should be scheduled 
periodically so new staff are covered. Library 
administrators need to realize that this training is especially 
important for staff employed in the libraries’ circulation 
department who work evenings and weekends.  
 
The authors found that an area of high risk, given recent 
news headlines, was bomb threats. Realizing that library 
employees were never trained on how to deal with a bomb 
threat, the authors decided to implement in-house training 
with the help of the university police department and safety 
officer. To mitigate the risk of real bomb threat, a 
simulation was planned. This included a bomb threat called 
into an employee at the circulation department. The 
employee was told to obtain as much information as 
possible from the caller: background noise, dialects, 
accents, sex, etc., and inform the police of all this because 
even something as innocuous as background noises may 
ultimately help locate the bomb, prevent an explosion, or 
reveal a hoax. Planning ahead and training staff is the 
wisest choice. For example, designate a code word, that 
when used, will alert employees of a bomb threat or 
emergency.  
 
Another area for employee training is the risk of active 
shooters. Such situations are different in that there may not 
be time to call for an orderly evacuation of the library. In 
some cases evacuation may even put employees and users 
in even greater danger; they should only evacuate a 
building if they can do so safely. If they cannot, they may 
need to hide to protect themselves. Another critical first 
step is to notify the police. But a call should only be 
undertaken if the employee is in a safe place and has a 
phone readily available. If there is no other option but to 
hide, police advocate piling furniture and whatever else is 
available to block the shooter. Police recommend fighting 
back in dire circumstances. Throwing books or other 
objects at the shooter long enough to distract or disable him 
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may provide enough time for employees and users to 
escape. In the event that the situation is happening in 
another building on campus, the library must be able to 
secure the building and wait for the police to give the all 
clear.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Risks in any academic library need to be considered when 
making decisions. Risks also need to be periodically 
assessed, particularly when technology changes, 
renovations occur, or other circumstances warrant. The risk 
assessment case study presented here occurred because a 
risk consultant was hired by the university to determine 
university wide risks. The libraries at the University of 
South Alabama were included because of a planned 
renovation allowing the Doy Leale McCall Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library to move into the main (Marx) library. 
Another reason was the collection of money for fines, lost 
books, interlibrary loans, and so forth. In any case, what 
library administration and department heads learned during 
this time needs to applied periodically—perhaps a three, 
four or five year review using the same methodology. 
 
Many colleges and universities, including the University of 
South Alabama, have implemented security alert systems to 
facilitate prompt notification when dangerous situations 
arise. These systems don’t negate the need to plan and train 
library employees for emergencies in order to protect 
people, materials and facilities. As problematic as it may 
be, risk management should not be overlooked. While it is 
difficult to anticipate the violence someone may do, or to 
avoid a theft, library administration can, and should, 
identify areas and implement procedures that take 
advantage of the library’s strengths to prevent theft, or to 
minimize harm to people, and damage to library materials. 
Risk assessments may be organized by departments and use 
department heads to help facilitate them, as well as 
developing and maintaining procedures and counter-
measures to limit risk. All countermeasures are likely to 
need updating as technology and the availability of 
products on the market change. Hopefully the information 
outlined in this article and in resources identified in the 
literature review will help. Working with safety compliance 
officers and maintenance staff should not be overlooked. 
Finally, risk assessment should not be regarded as a task 
that may need to be checked off but, rather a process that 
should be employed by library administration to protect the 
safety of library staff and users. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Risks and vulnerabilities     Countermeasures 
 
 
Leaks Initiate a phone tree so key personnel are informed. 
Pre-position tarps, mops and buckets so they can be easily 
accessed. 
Provide list of key campus contacts, with phone 
numbers/email addresses. 
Art works Consider installing anti-theft devices and video surveillance 
system when applicable. 
Computer hardware and software Consider installing anti-theft devices and video. surveillance 
system. Consider replacing workstations with thin-clients. 
Doors and windows Inspect locks and repair or replace damaged hardware. 
Install window treatments to limit visibility of room 
contents. 
Periodically inventory keys assigned to staff and faculty. 
Establish procedures for securing building at closing. 
Hazmet (storage & use of chemicals) Consult with university safety office about proper storage, 
use, policies, etc. 
Periodically inventory storage closets so it is known what 
Hazmet materials are stored properly in the library. 
Natural disasters and emergencies Follow university emergency response and recovery 
procedures and policies for power outages, fire, flooding, 
weather, bomb, terrorist, hazmet, and similar incidents. 
Otherwise, follow best practices. Have basic supplies on-
hand for immediate recovery. 
Theft Consider range of measures from installing signage, anti-
theft devices/locks and video surveillance to purchasing 
lockable cabinets. 
Violence Protect patrons and staff. 
Contact campus police.  
In extreme cases, evacuate the building but only if        
possible to do safely 
Bomb threat If threat is phoned in, get as much information as you 
possible from the caller. 
Contact campus police. 
Initiate evacuation of the library. 
People should be moved away from the building to safe 
areas. 
 
  
